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War Platon ein Substanzdualist?

Eine geistphilosophische Perspektive und ihre Implikationen für Körper

Was Plato a Substance Dualist?

A Perspective from the Philosophy of Mind and its Implications for Bodies

Against the background of contemporary Philosophy of Mind Plato is usually considered a substance dualist holding something like an early version of Descartes' controversial doctrine. Occasionally this assumption has been challenged. It has been claimed that Plato was only a metaphysical dualist, sharply distinguishing between the world of ideas and the perceptible world, but not an anthropological dualist, sharply distinguishing between soul and body, or that Plato did not hold a substance dualism, but only an attributive dualism. Sometimes his late philosophy was even seen as approaching Aristotelian Hylemorphism. I do not think that these unorthodox proposals are entirely convincing. But, as I want to show, there are indeed some ontological, psychological and cosmological problems, telling against the standard dualistic interpretation and its problematic implications for bodies.